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Problems of Communist History
W E A R E  TO D A Y  at the end of that historical epoch in the 
development of socialism which began with the collapse of the 
Second International in 1914 and the victory of the Bolsheviks 
in October 1917. This is therefore a suitable time to  survey the 
history of the Com m unist Parties which were the characteristic 
and dom inant forms of the revolutionary movem ent in this era. 
The task is difficult because Communist Party  historiography has 
special com plications, which will be considered below in connection 
with Jam es Klugm ann’s regrettable failure to overcome them 1, 
but also for wider reasons.
Each Com m unist Party was the child of the m arriage of two 
ill-assorted partners, a national left and the O ctober Revolution. 
T hat m arriage was based both on love and convenience. For
1. James Klugman, History o f the Comm unist Party o f Great Britain : 
Formation and early years. Vol. 1, 1919-24 (Lawrence and Wishart), 
381 pp., 63s.
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anyone whose political memories go back no further than K hrush­
chev’s denunciation of Stalin, or the Sino-Soviet split, it is almost 
impossible to conceive what the O ctober Revolution m eant to 
those who are now middle-aged and old. It was the first prole­
tarian  revolution, the first regime in histoijy to set about the 
construction of the socialist order, the proof both of the profundity 
of the contradictions of capitalism, which produced wars and 
slumps, and the possibility— the certainty— that socialist revolution 
would succeed. It was the beginning of world revolution. It was 
the beginning of the new world. Only the naive believed that 
Russia was the w orkers’ paradise, bu t even among the sophisticated 
it enjoyed the general indulgence which the left of the 1960’s now 
gives only to revolutionary regimes in some small countries, such as 
Cuba and Vietnam. A t the same time the decisions of revolution­
aries in other countries to adopt the Bolshevik model of organisation, 
to  subordinate themselves to a Bolshevik International (i.e. eventually 
to the CPSU  and Stalin), was due not only to natural enthusiasm, 
but also to the evident failure of all alternative forms of organisation, 
strategy and tactics. Social democracy and anarcho-syndicalism had 
failed, while Lenin had succeeded. It seemed sensible to  follow the 
recipe of success.
The element of rational calculation increasingly prevailed, after 
the ebbing of what had, in the years after 1917, looked like the 
tide of global revolution. It is, of course, almost impossible to 
separate it in practice from the passionate and total loyalty which 
individual Com munists felt to  their cause, which was equated with 
their Party, which in turn  m eant loyalty to the Com m unist In ter­
national, and the USSR (i.e. Stalin). Still, whatever their private 
feelings, it soon became clear that separation from the Communist 
Party, whether by expulsion or secession, m eant an end to  effective 
revolutionary activity. Bolshevism in the Com intern period did 
not produce schisms and heresies of practical im portance except 
in a few rem ote countries of small global significance, such as 
Ceylon. Those who left the Party were forgotten or ineffective, 
unless they rejoined the ‘reform ists' o r went into some overtly 
‘bourgeois’ group, in which case they were no longer of interest 
to revolutionaries, o r unless they wrote books which might o r might 
not become influential on the left some thirty years later. The real 
history of Trotskyism  as a political trend in the international 
communist movem ent is posthumous. The strongest among such 
exiled M arxists worked quietly in isolation until times changed, 
the weakest broke under the strain and turned passionately anti­
communist, to  supply the C IA  culture of the 1950’s with several 
m ilitants, the average retreated into the hard  shell of sectarianism. 
The com m unist movem ent was not effectively split. Still, it paid a 
price for its cohesion: a substantial, sometimes an enormous, tu rn­
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over of members. The joke about the largest party being that of 
the ex-Communists has a basis in fact.
The discovery that Com munists had little choice about their 
loyalty to Stalin and the USSR was first m ade— though perhaps 
only at the highest levels of the parties— in the middle 1920’s. 
Clear-sighted and unusually strong-minded Com m unist leaders 
like Palm iro Togliatti soon realised that they could not in the interest 
of their national movement, afford to  oppose whoever came out 
on top in the CPSU, and tried to  explain this to  those less in 
touch with the M oscow scene, such as Gramsci. (O f course even 
a total willingness to  go along with Stalin was no  guarantee of 
political, or for residents of the USSR physical survival in the 
1930’s.) U nder the circum stances loyalty to M oscow ceased to 
depend on approval of the M oscow line, but became an operational 
necessity. T hat m ost Com munists also tried to  rationalise this by 
proving to  themselves that M oscow was right at all times is another 
m atter, though it is relevant to  the argument, because it confirmed 
the clear-headed m inority in the belief that they would never be 
able to take their parties with them against Moscow. A  British 
Communist who attended the meeting of the leadership in September 
1939 which was told that the war was not, after all, supposed 
to  be a people’s anti-fascist war but just an  im perialist one, recalls 
saying to himself: ‘T hat’s it. There’s nothing to  be done. A n 
imperialist war it is.’ H e was right a t the time. N obody bucked 
M oscow successfully until T ito carried his party against Stalin in 
1 9 4 8— to Stalin’s and a lot of other party  leaders’ surprise. Still, 
he was by then not only a leader of a party  but also of a nation 
and a State.
There was, of course, another factor involved: internationalism . 
Today, when the international Com m unist m ovem ent has largely 
ceased to  exist as such, it is hard to  recapture the immense strength 
which its m em bers drew from the consciousness of being soldiers 
in a single international army, operating, with whatever tactical 
multiformity and flexibility, a single grand strategy of world revolu­
tion. Hence the impossibility of any fundam ental or long-term 
conflict between the interest of a national movement and the 
International, which was the real Party, of which the national units 
were no more than disciplined sections. T hat strength was based 
both on realistic argum ent and moral conviction. W hat convinced 
in Lenin was not so much his socio-economic analysis— after all, 
at a pinch som ething like his theory of imperialism  can be derived 
from earlier m arxist writings— but his palpable genius for organising 
a revolutionary party and mastering the tactics and strategy of 
making revolution. A t the same time the Com intern was intended 
to, and very largely did, give the movem ent immunity against the 
terrible collapse of its ideals.
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Communists, it was agreed, would never behave like international 
social democracy in 1914, abandoning its flag to follow the banners 
of nationalism , into m utual massacre. And, it m ust be said, they 
did not. There is something heroic about the British and French 
CPs in September 1939. Nationalism , political calculation, even 
com m on sense, pulled one way, yet they unhesitatingly chose to 
put the interests of the international m ovem ent first. As it happens, 
they were tragically and absurdly wrong. But their error, or rather 
that of the Soviet line of the moment, and the politically absurd 
assum ption in M oscow that a given international situation implied 
the same reactions by very differently situated parties, should not 
lead us to ridicule the spirit of their action. This is how the 
socialists of Europe should have acted in 1914 and did not: carrying 
out the decisions of their International. This is how the Communists 
did act when another world war broke out. I t was not their fault 
that the International should have told them  to do something else.
The problem  of those who write the history of Communist parties 
is therefore unusually difficult. They m ust recapture the unique 
and, among secular movements, unprecedented temper of Bolshevism, 
equally rem ote from the liberalism of m ost historians and the 
permissive and self-indulgent activism of m ost contem porary ultras. 
There is no understanding it w ithout a grasp of that sense of total 
devotion which made the Party in Auschwitz m ake its m embers pay 
their dues in cigarettes (inconceivably precious and almost impossible 
to obtain in an exterm ination camp), which m ade the cadres accept 
the order not merely to kill G erm ans in occupied Paris, but first 
to acquire, individually, the arms to do so, and which made it 
virtually unthinkable for them  to refuse to return to Moscow 
even to  certain  im prisonm ent or death. There is no understanding 
either the achievements or the perversions of Bolshevism without 
this, and bo th  have been monumental; and certainly no understanding 
of the extraordinary success of Com m unism  as a system of education 
for political work.
But the historians m ust also separate the national elements within 
Com m unist parties from the international, including those currents 
within national movements, which carried out the international line 
not because they had to, but because they were in genuine agreement 
with it. They must separate the genuinely international elements 
in Com intern policy from those which reflected only the state 
interests of the USSR or the tactical or other pre-occupations of 
Soviet internal politics. In both national and international policies, 
they m ust distinguish between those based on knowledge, ignorance 
or hunch, on marxist analysis (good or bad), on local tradition, 
the im itation of suitable or unsuitable foreign examples, or sheer 
trial and error, tactical insight o r ideological formula. They must,
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above all, make up their mind which policies were successful and 
sensible and which were neither, resisting the tem ptation to  dismiss 
the Com intern en bloc as a failure or a Russian puppet show.
These problems are particularly difficult for the historian of the 
British CP because, except for a few brief periods, they appear to 
be so unim portant in this country. The party  was both  entirely 
loyal to Moscow, entirely unwilling to involve itself in Russian or 
international controversies, and an unquestioned chip off the native 
working class block. Its path  was not littered with lost o r expelled 
leaders, heresies and deviations. Admittedly it enjoyed the advant­
age of smallness, which m eant that the International did not expect 
the spectacular results which pu t such a strain on, say, the G erm an 
party, and of operating in a country which, even on the most 
cursory inspection, was unlike m ost of Europe and the other contin­
ents. Being the child, not of a political split in social-democracy, 
but of the unification of the various groups of the extrem e left, 
which had always operated to  some extent outside the L abor 
Party, it could not be plausibly regarded as an alternative mass 
party  to Labor, at least an immediate alternative. H ence it was 
left free— indeed it was generally encouraged— to pursue the tasks 
to which m ilitant British leftwingers would have devoted them ­
selves anyway, and because they were Communists, to  do so with 
unusual self-abnegation and efficiency. Indeed initially Lenin was ' 
chiefly concerned to  discourage the sectarianism and  hostility to 
Labor, to  which the native ultra-Left was spontaneously drawn. The 
periods when the international line went against the grain of the 
national leftwing strategy and tactics (as in 1928-34 and 1939-41) 
stand out as anomalies in the history of British Communism, just 
because there was so obviously —  as there was not in all other 
countries —  such a strategy. So long as there was no realistic 
prospect of revolution, there was only one TU C and the L abor Party 
was the only —  and still growing —  party likely to win the support 
of the politically conscious workers on a national scale, in practice 
there was only one realistically conceivable road of socialist advance. 
T he disarray of the Left today (inside and outside the L abor Party) 
is due largely to the fact that these things can no longer be taken 
for granted and that there are no generally accepted alternative 
strategies.
Nevertheless, this apparent simplicity of the British com m unists’ 
situation conceals a num ber of questions. In  the first place, w hat 
exactly did the International expect of the British, other than that 
they should turn  themselves into a proper Communist Party, and
—  from a not entirely certain date —  tha t they should assist the 
com m unist movements in the Em pire? W hat precisely was the role 
of Britain in its 'general strategy and how did it change? This is by
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no means clear from the existing historical literature, which is 
admittedly (apart from M acfarlane’s book) not of high quality.-
In the second place, why was the im pact of the CP in the 1920’s 
so modest, even by unexacting standards? Its membership was tiny 
and fluctuating, its successes the reflection partly of the radical 
and m ilitant m ood of the L abor movem ent, partly of the fact that 
communists still operated largely within the Labor Party or at 
least with its local support. Not until the 1930’s did the CP 
become, in spite of its modest but growing membership, its electoral 
weakness and the systematic hostility of the Labor leadership, the 
effective national left.
Thirdly, what was the base of com m unist support? Why did it 
fail, again before the 1930’s, to attract any significant body of 
support among intellectuals, and rapidly shed most of the relatively 
few it attracted (mostly from the ex-Fabian and Guild Socialist 
Left)? W hat was the nature of its unusually strong influence —  
though not necessarily membership —  in Scotland and Wales? W hat 
happened in the 1930’s to turn  the party  into what it had not 
previously been, a body of factory militants?
And, of course, there are all the questions which will inevitably 
be asked about the rightness or wrongness of the party’s changing 
line, and m ore fundamentally, of this particu lar type of organisation 
in the context of inter-war and post-1945 Britain.
Jam es Klugmann has not seriously tackled any of them. This 
extremely able and lucid m an is clearly capable of writing a 
satisfactory history of the Com m unist Party, and where he feels 
unconstrained, he does so. Thus he provides the best and clearest 
account of the form ation of the party at present available. U nfor­
tunately he is paralysed by the impossibility of being both a good 
historian and a loyal functionary. The only way yet discovered to 
write a public “official” history of any organisation is to  hand 
the m aterial over to one or more professional historians who are 
sufficiently in sympathy not to  do a hatchet job, sufficiently unin­
volved not to  mind opening cupboards for fear of possible skeletons, 
and who can, if the worst come to the worst, be officially disavowed. 
T hat is, essentially, what the British governm ent did with the official 
history of the Second W orld W ar, and the result has been that 
W ebster and Frankland were able to  produce a history of the air 
war which destroys many fam iliar myths and treads on many 
service and political toes, but is both scholarly and useful —  not 
least to anyone who wishes to  judge or plan strategy. The Italian 
CP is the only one which has so far chosen this sensible, but to most 
politicians almost unthinkable, course. Paolo Spriano has therefore
2. L. J. M acfarlane: The British Comm unist Party: Its Origin and Develop­
m ent until 1929 (Macgibbon and Kee, 1966), 63s,
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been able to write a debatable, but serious and scholarly work.3 
James Klugmann has been able to do neither. He has merely used 
his considerable gifts to avoid writing a disreputable one.
In doing so he has, I am afraid, wasted m uch of his time. W hat, 
after all, is the use of spending ten years on the sources —  including 
those in M oscow —  when the only precise references to  contem porary 
unpublished CP sources —  give or take one or two —  appear to 
num ber seven and the only references even to  printed Communist 
International sources (including Inprecorr) num ber less than a 
dozen in a volume of 370 pages. The rest are substantially refer­
ences to the published reports, pam phlets and especially periodicals 
of the CP in this period. In  1921-2 the Presidium of the Com in­
tern discussed Britain 13 times —  more often than any country 
other than the French, Italian, Hungarian and G erm an parties. One 
would not have known it from Klugmann’s book, whose index 
lacks all reference to  Zinoviev (except in connection with the forged 
letter bearing his nam e), Borodin, Petrovsky-Bennet, or, for that 
m atter, so purely British a field of party activity as the L abor 
Research D epartm ent.
A n adequate history of the CP cannot be written by systematically 
avoiding or fudging genuinely controversial issues and m atter likely 
to  be regarded as indiscreet o r bad public relations w ithin the 
organisation. I t  cannot even be offset by describing and docu­
menting, more fully than ever before, the activities of the militants. 
I t is interesting to  have 160 or so pages on the party’s work from 
1920 to 1923, but the basic fact about this period is that recorded 
in Zinoviev’s R eport to  the 4th W orld Congress at the end of 1922, 
namely that “In no other country, perhaps, does the com m unist 
movement make such slow progress” , and this fact is not really 
faced. Even the popular contem porary explanation tha t this was 
due to mass unem ploym ent is not seriously discussed. In  brief, 
Klugmann has done some justice to  the devoted and often forgotten 
militants who served the British working class as best they knew 
how. He has written a textbook for their successors in party 
schools, with all the clarity and ability which have m ade his high 
reputation as a teacher in  such courses. H e has provided a fair 
am ount of new inform ation, some of which will only be recognised 
by the very expert at deciphering careful form ulations, and little of 
which —  on im portant m atters —  is documented.
B ut he has neither written a satisfactory history of the CP nor 
of the role of the C P  in B ritish politics. A nd if he applies the 
same m ethods to  volum e 2, where the “controversial issues” become 
less easily avoidable, he will produce an even m ore disappointing 
book.
3. Paolo Spriano: Storia del Partito Communista Italiano, Vol. 1, Da Bordiga 
a Gramsci (Einaudi, 1967), 4000 lire.
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